Public Objection Number 5

Australian Democrats (Queensland Division) Inc

35 pages

OBJECTION
5

AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS™
www.democrats.org.au

(Queensland Division) Inc
Suite 130 7/421 Brunswick St, Fortitude Valley QLD 4006
Tel: 32161249

September 4, 2003



Secretary,
Queensland Redistribution Committee,
Australian Electoral Commission,
Level 7 488 Queen Street
Brisbane Q 4001

Dear Sir/Madam,

The Australian Democrats (Queensland Division) Inc wish to lodge a formal objection to the 2003 Proposed Redistribution of Queensland. Our objection takes three grounds:

i) We argue that the Commission has failed to produce a redistribution free from political bias. Indeed, the boundaries prepared by the Commission provide an average advantage to the Government of 1.1% across the 14 most marginal seats, and would require the Opposition to obtain a two-party preferred vote of 51.52% of the vote (assuming uniform state-wide swings). This level of bias breaches the overriding duty of the Commission to promote elections which are free and fair. This duty is implicit in the High Court's recognition of a principle of representative democracy underlined by section 24 of the Constitution, particularly that "elections must be free"[1], and that at some point "there ceases to be a system of representative government because there is a failure in ultimate control by periodic popular election".[2] It is submitted that, while the Commission's principal duty is to apply the statutory criteria in the Act, in recognising that these criteria lend themselves to numerous complying possible geographic permutations, the Commission should prefer a permutation that best supports the constitutional principle of representative democracy and its pre-condition of free and fair elections.

ii) The Commission sails too close to the wind in breaching its overriding obligation of numerical equality of electorates contained in section 66(3)(a) by allowing low growth electorates like Wide Bay, Capricornia and Maranoa to have very low projected enrolments in 2007, and high

[1] Lange v ABC (1997)
[2] Gummow J in McGinty v Commonwealth (1997)

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growth electorates like Bonner and Moreton to have very high projected enrolments in 2007.

iii) The Commission fails to properly apply the community of interest, transportation and geographical criteria in section 66(3)(b) to several seats, and that these criteria – along with the overriding principle of representative government – can be better met with adjustments to these boundaries.

This objection proposes changes to 16 electorates, and no changes to 12 electorates. Changes to 8 electorates are minor (fewer than 4000 electors). There is a proposed swap of 12,700 electors between Petrie and Lilley, and of 10,500 electors between Griffith, Bonner and Moreton. The other major changes affect Blair, Oxley and Moreton.

These improve community of interest criteria, reunite Crows Nest Shire in Groom, place 90% of Logan City in Rankin, put most of Ipswich City's inner suburbs in Blair, unite the Chelmer-Oxley rail corridor suburbs in Oxley, unite Annerley and Yeronga back in Moreton, unite The Gap back in Ryan, reduce the Petrie "tongue" into the inner northern suburbs, and better allocate the shires of the Burnett region between Wide Bay, Hinkler and Capricornia.

On the "representative democracy" criterion, these changes reduce the pro-Government bias across the 14 most marginal seats from 1.1% to -0.35% and reduce the two-party preferred vote required by the Opposition to win a majority of seats from 51.52% to 51.12%.

The Democrats would welcome the opportunity to provide a presentation on this objection to the Committee. The Committee should contact Senator John Cherry on 07 3252 9129 should it require further information.

Yours sincerely,



Stephen Shannon
President
Australian Democrats (Queensland Division) Inc.

A. OBJECTION THAT THE BOUNDARIES FAIL TO PROMOTE ELECTIONS THAT ARE FREE AND FAIR

A.1. LEGAL BACKGROUND:

Section 24 of the Constitution provides that:

> "The House of Representatives should be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth, and the number of such members shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of senators. The number of members chosen in the serval states shall be in proportion to the respective number of their people..."

There have been several Court cases as to the extent to which this section implies a principle of "representative democracy" on the Constitution[3]. The key case was ***McGinty v Commonwealth (1997)HCA***, concerning a challenge to electoral weighting in the WA Parliament and claiming an implied right to "one vote one value". The Court dismissed the challenge by a 4-2 majority. The majority held (as per Brennan CJ) that

> "The principle of "representative democracy" can be given the status of a constitutional imperative, but only in so far as the meaning and content of that principle are implied in the text and structure of the Constitution."

Justices Toohey and Gaudron dissented, arguing that representative democracy was implied in the Constitution. As Toohey J said:

> 34. The principle thus enunciated is not in absolute terms but it follows that a general principle of equal electorates is "a minimal requirement for a representative democracy". In that event the principle is part of the Australian Constitution, even if not expressed in any provision. It derives from s 24 ("chosen by the people") but more fundamentally from the very structure of the system of government enshrined in the Constitution. In the end it must be accepted that equality of political rights is not achieved "if the vote of a person in one part of the country has a greater effect in securing parliamentary representation than the vote of a person in another part of the country". .

Gaudron J was less emphatic, arguing that: "At some point choice by electors could cease to be able to be described as a choice by the people of the Commonwealth."

This view was also echoed by some judges in the majority. Gummow J stated (my emphasis underlined):

> 109. I would accept that the variations in numbers of electors or people in single-member divisions could be so grossly disproportionate as to deny ultimate control by popular election. I would, with respect, also agree with the point made by McTiernan and Jacobs JJ in *McKinlay* that, when it arises, <u>such a question is to be determined by reference to the particular stage which then has been reached in the evolution of representative government.</u>

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[3] Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News v Willis (1992) 177 CLR 1; Theophanus v Herald & Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 104

.....

110. I agree also with the statement by McTiernan and Jacobs JJ in the same passage in McKinlay to the effect that the point at which there ceases to be a system of representative government because there is a failure in ultimate control by periodic popular election involves a question of degree and is on which cannot be determined in the abstract.

On the role of administrative bodies in electoral distributions, Gummow sounded a warning on the heavy responsibility on such bodies to promote "representative democracy":

> 113.... In any given case, it will be a question to be determined by reference to the circumstances of that case whether judicial review is required to ensure that the exercise in the particular case of the authority conferred by the legislature is confined within constitutional limits.[4]

McHugh was strongly of the view that there was no implied need for parity in the Constitution. His obiter is very relevant because he recognised that malapportionment can take whose forms than electoral weighting:

> Once the party system became firmly established, voters' loyalties were to the parties and their leaders rather than to individual members of Parliament. Not equality of voting power but the extent to which a political party's vote translates into seats in Parliament is now seen by many political scientists as the surest guide to the fairness of a particular political system.[5] Equality of numbers in electorates does not guarantee representative government. Because of the party system, electorates can be gerrymandered notwithstanding that they meet the equality standard.[6] Of course, that does not mean that equality of numbers in electoral divisions is not extremely important if an electorate is divided into divisions.

He cites the Supreme Court case of ***Karcher v Daggett*** (1983) 462 US 725 at 765, where Stevens J. said:

> "(I)f population equality provides the only check on political gerrymandering, it would be virtually impossible to fashion a fair and effective remedy in a case like this. For if the shape of legislative districts is entirely unconstrained, the dominant majority could no doubt respond to an unfavourable judgment by providing an even more grotesque-appearing map that reflects acceptable numerical equality with even greater political inequality."

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[4] See Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556 at 614-615 per Brennan J.

[5] Birch, Representative and Responsible Government: An Essay on the British Constitution, (1964) at 74-75, 76-78. Rose, "Elections and electoral systems: choices and alternatives" in Bogdanor and Butler (eds), Democracy and Elections: Electoral systems and their political consequences (1983) at 40-43; Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty Seven Democracies 1945-1990, (1993) at 124-130.

[6] Bagger, The Supreme Court and Congressional Apportionment: Slippery Slope to Equal Representation Gerrymandering, (1985) 38 Rutgers Law Review 109 at 110-111.

McHugh also pointed out that:

> 73. Conversely, inequality in the numerical sizes of electoral divisions does not necessarily mean a party is unfairly represented....The way that a party's voters are dispersed through the electorate is likely to have a greater effect on representation in the Houses of Parliament than is equality of electoral districts.

Gummow also noted that: "Experience in the United States demonstrates that to insist, on constitutional grounds, upon equal numbers of electors in constituencies does not necessarily avoid any skewing of the overall party vote away from party representation in the legislature."

The decision in this case partly reflected the earlier High Court decision of ***Attorney-General (Cth) (Ex rel McKinlay) v The Commonwealth (1975) CLR 1***. In this case, the Court found 6-1 that there was no implied requirement in the Federal Constitution for electorates to be exactly equal. However, most judges conceded that this was a matter of degree, with Gummow J in the McGinty case adopting the McTiernan & Jacobs view in the McKinley case.

More recently, after the confusion of the "implied rights" cases flowing back to several recent court decisions, the Court has sought in ***Lange v ABC (1997) HCA*** to clarify its position. In a unanimous judgement, the Court ruled that:

> Freedom of communication on matters of government and politics is an indispensable incident of that system of representative government which the Constitution creates by directing that the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate shall be "directly chosen by the people" of the Commonwealth and the States, respectively. At federation, representative government was understood to mean a system of government where the people in free elections elected their representatives to the legislative chamber which occupies the most powerful position in the political system. As Birch points out:[7] "it is the manner of choice of members of the legislative assembly, rather than their characteristics or their behaviour, which is generally taken to be the criterion of a representative form of government." However, to have a full understanding of the concept of representative government, Birch also states that[:
>
> "we need to add that the chamber must occupy a powerful position in the political system and that the elections to it must be free, with all that this implies in the way of freedom of speech and political organization."
>
> Communications concerning political or government matters between the electors and the elected representatives, between the electors and the candidates for election and between the electors themselves were central to the system of representative government, as it was understood at federation. While the system of representative government for which the Constitution provides does not expressly mention freedom of communication, it can hardly be doubted, given the history of representative

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[7] Birch, *Representative and Responsible Government*, (1964) at 17; *ACTV* (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 230; *Theophanous* (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 200.

> government and the holding of elections under that system in Australia prior to federation, that the elections for which the Constitution provides were intended to be free elections in the sense explained by Birch. Furthermore, because the choice given by ss 7 and 24 must be a true choice with "an opportunity to gain an appreciation of the available alternatives", as Dawson J pointed out in *Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth*[8], legislative power cannot support an absolute denial of access by the people to relevant information about the functioning of government in Australia and about the policies of political parties and candidates for election.
>
> That being so, ss 7 and 24 and the related sections of the Constitution necessarily protect that freedom of communication between the people concerning political or government matters which enables the people to exercise a free and informed choice as electors. Those sections do not confer personal rights on individuals. Rather they preclude the curtailment of the protected freedom by the exercise of legislative or executive power.

It should also be noted that the Courts have been taking a stronger interest in the political process generally, with an increasing preparedness to intervene in political matters in the interests of democracy. A string of cases have, for example found a strong public interest in judicial intervention in the affairs of political parties (for example: ***Baldwin v Everingham*** (1993) 1 Qd R 10, ***Thornley v Heffernan***, CLS 1995 NSWSC EQ 150 and CLS 1995 NSWSC EQ 206, ***Clarke v ALP*** (1999) 74 SASR 11, ***Sullivan V Della Bosca*** [1999] NSWSC 136; and ***Tucker v Herron and others*** (2001), Supreme Court QLD 6735 of 2001. The recent Sheppherdson Inquiry into Electoral Fraud in Queensland and high profile prosecutions against Pauline Hanson and Karen Ehrmann are further evidence of growing public expectation that elections be free and fair.

A.2. RECENT APPROACHES TO REMOVING ELECTORAL BIAS

Queensland is particularly sensitive to the issues of electoral districting issues, following the analysis of the Fitzgerald Inquiry in 1989. This has been followed through in Queensland, particularly through the work of the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, which produced a set of fundamental democratic principles. These principles have been incorporated into the Charter of the Electoral Commission of Queensland. They include:

> 9. Electoral legislation and procedures must be open and regularly reviewed, taking into consideration changing community expectations so that public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system and outcomes can be maintained.
>
> 10. Electoral officials must be politically neutral and the conduct and administration of electoral events must never be influenced by political considerations."

The AEC, on its website, lists the core values of its organisation and staff as:

- Independence and neutrality
- Integrity and accuracy

[8] (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 187.

- Mutual respect
- Respect for the law
- Service
- Transparency

The AEC's website also includes an important paper by the Parliamentary Library's electoral expert, Gerard Newman. The introduction to his paper lists the criteria by which electoral systems should be based:

> Given the almost infinite variety of systems and combinations that are possible it is probably worthwhile considering some basic requirements that a truly representative system should possess.
> An electoral system should:
> - result in a legislature that reflects the electorate's wishes.
> - result in a government that reflects the majority opinion of the electorate.
> - allow for stable government.
> - ensure the election of members whose personal qualities best fit them for legislative responsibilities.
> - be easily understood by the electorate.
> - ensure a quick result.
> - allow effective constituent representation.
> - allow elector choice of candidates.

Since changes to the South Australian Constitution in 1991, electoral divisions in South Australia have been subject to an overriding requirement of electoral fairness. Section 83 of the Constitution Act provides:

> **Electoral fairness and other criteria**
> **83.** (1) In making an electoral redistribution the Commission must ensure, as far as practicable, that the electoral redistribution is fair to prospective candidates and groups of candidates so that, if candidates of a particular group attract more than 50 per cent of the popular vote (determined by aggregating votes cast throughout the State and allocating preferences to the necessary extent), they will be elected in sufficient numbers to enable a government to be formed.
>
> (2) In making an electoral redistribution, the Commission must have regard, as far as practicable, to—
> *(a)*the desirability of making the electoral redistribution so as to reflect communities of interest of an economic, social, regional or other kind;
> *(b)*the population of each proposed electoral district;
> *(c)*the topography of areas within which new electoral boundaries will be drawn;
> *(d)*the feasibility of communication between electors affected by the redistribution and their parliamentary representative in the House of Assembly;
> *(e)*the nature of substantial demographic changes that the Commission considers likely to take place in proposed electoral districts between the conclusion of its present proceedings and the date of the expiry of the present term of the House of Assembly,
> and may have regard to any other matters it thinks relevant.
>
> (3) For the purposes of this section a reference to a group of candidates includes not only candidates endorsed by the same political party but also candidates whose political stance is such that there is reason to believe that they would, if elected in sufficient numbers, be prepared to act in concert to form or support a government.

To achieve this, the South Australian Commission:

> "...redraws the boundaries to meet the new quoat determining in doing so, as best it can, what the result would have been at the previous election had the electors been voting in the new districts and then making whatever adjustments appear necessary to satisfy the fairness requirements of s.83."[9]

The 1995 Joint Committee on Electoral Affairs rejected the South Australian approach on the grounds that it would lead to a downgrading of the other statutory criteria and because only one of the one of the four elections held since 1984 (1990) had resulted in the "wrong" answer (a Government holding office with just 49.9% of the two party preferred vote):

> "In the absence of a clearly demonstrated need, the Committee does not recommend that Commonwealth redistributions be complicated by the addition of a fairness test."[10]

This argument falls down after the 1998 election, which saw the Howard Government returned with a clear majority of the seats despite winning only 49.1% of the vote. In fact, of the last twenty elections in Australia, five have produced a Government with minority electoral support. Given the current state of evolution of public expectation about representative democracy (to paraphrase Gummow), it is submitted that, in applying its statutory criteria, the Commission should have regard to the desirability of promoting the implied constitutional principle of representative democracy and its underlying condition of free and fair elections.

This need not result in a "downgrading" of the other statutory criteria. Rather it should be recognised that as the criteria of section 66 are capable of producing numerous geographic permutations, and the Commission should opt for one that less biased over one showing a strong level of bias to either the Government or the Opposition.

In conclusion, it is submitted that the Commission has a public duty to produce an electoral redistribution that is as free from electoral bias as possible consistent with the criteria of section 66. To fail to do so is to reduce public confidence in the electoral system, and hence in the process of Government. The best judgement of whether an electoral system is fair is whether it produces a Government that reflects the majority opinion of the electorate by reference to voting trends at the most recent election.

[9] Electoral Boundaries Commission "Report on the 2003 Redistribution" South Australian Government para 20.

[10] Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Report on Electoral Redistributions (1995) p. 48

A.3. HOW BIASED IS THE PROPOSED QUEENSLAND DISTRIBUTION:

Bias is probably best measured by the two party vote change required to change Government. Simply put, 50% of the vote should equal 50% of the seats, while more than 50% of the vote should equal more than 50% of the seats. The Parliamentary Library has produced estimated two-party preferred votes for the new boundaries based on the 2001 election results:

TABLE ONE: ESTIMATED TWO PARTY PREFERRED VOTE CURRENT AND PROPOSED BOUNDARIES (%)

	Old Boundaries		New Boundaries	
	ALP	LP/NP	ALP	LP/NP
Blair	41.5	58.5	43.4	56.6
Bonner	n.a.	n.a.	51.8	48.2
Bowman	51.4	48.6	46.9	53.1
Brisbane	53.1	46.9	50.7	49.3
Capricornia	56.9	43.1	55.5	44.5
Dawson (a)	42.0	58.0	42.0	58.0
Dickson	44.0	56.0	44.0	56.0
Fadden	37.7	62.3	36.9	63.1
Fairfax	40.8	59.2	40.8	59.2
Fisher	37.9	62.1	38.2	61.8
Forde	42.6	57.4	43.0	57.0
Griffith	55.7	44.3	56.1	43.9
Groom (a)	34.9	65.1	34.9	65.1
Herbert	48.4	51.6	48.5	51.5
Hinkler	50.0	50.0	47.8	52.2
Kennedy	41.0	59.0	41.6	58.4
Leichhardt (a)	43.6	56.4	43.6	56.4
Lilley	54.8	45.2	54.6	45.4
Longman	47.3	52.7	47.5	52.5
Maranoa	34.0	66.0	34.6	65.4
Mcpherson	37.5	62.5	37.8	62.2
Moncrieff	34.6	65.4	33.7	66.3
Moreton	45.8	54.2	47.6	52.4
Oxley	58.1	41.9	58.0	42.0
Petrie	46.6	53.4	46.8	53.2
Rankin	56.7	43.3	52.4	47.6
Ryan	41.4	58.6	40.9	59.1
Wide Bay	39.3	60.7	40.1	59.9

(Source: Parliamentary Library)

At the 2001 election, the Government won 54.86% of the two candidate preferred vote, and a two-party preferred majority in 20 of the 27 seats.[11]. The Opposition party's 45.14% translated into just 25.9% of the seats. For the Opposition to win a majority of the seats (14) would have required a uniform swing of 6.4% (Leichhardt), and an effective two candidate preferred vote of 51.52%.

[11] Kennedy was won by a former Government member as an Independent, but with the notional Government two party-preferred vote of 58.95%

On the new boundaries, the Government's 54.86% vote translates into 21 of the 28 seats (75%). To win a majority of the seats (15) would still require a uniform swing of 6.4% (Leichhardt) and an effective two candidate preferred vote of 51.52%. To win 50% of the seats (14) would require a two candidate preferred swing of 6% (Dickson) and a two candidate preferred vote of 51.12%.

This suggests that the proposed boundaries contain a benefit to the Government of between 1.1% and 1.5%. This bias appears to be systemic, in that it makes it harder for the Opposition to win seats at similar levels of votes.

An estimate of the systemic bias can be calculated by estimating how many seats could be won by the Government and the Opposition assuming a uniform state-wide two-party preferred vote swing. Thus, for the Opposition to win all 28 seats, it would require a uniform swing of 16.3%, which, added to its 2001 State-wide vote of 45.14%, translates to a notional two-party preferred vote of 61.44%. Similarly, for the Coalition to win all 28 seats would require a swing of 8%, and a notional two-party preferred vote of 62.14%.

This exercise was repeated for all 28 seats to estimate the vote both Government and Opposition would require to win anywhere between 1 and 28 seats. The Opposition vote was then subtracted from the Coalition vote and divided by 28 to calculate an "estimated systemic bias". The figure so-calculated was 0.3%. [12]However, if the worst four seats at either end were removed (i.e. the seats requiring a State wide two party preferred vote of over 58% or more), the average bias rises to 0.68%.

If the 14 most marginal seats are considered (i.e. needing a State wide two-party preferred vote of less than 54.5% to win), the bias rises to a significant 1.1%.

It is worth noting that, in 10 of the last 22 Federal elections (and in 4 of the last 6 elections), the winning party's national two-party preferred margin was less than 1.1%[13]. A systemic bias of 1.1% to the Government across the 14 most marginal seats, and of 0.68% across the 20 most winnable seats in Queensland has the real risk to frustrate the electoral will of the people. As such, the proposed redistribution fails to adequately promote the principles of representative democracy.

It is our strong submission that the Commission, in seeking to choose the appropriate geographical permutation that meets the various criteria of section 66(3) should choose the permutation that best meets the criteria of promoting representative democracy and free and fair elections. This implies a set of set of boundaries which provides as little bias towards Government or Opposition parties as possible, as measured by two-party preferred votes.

[12] See Appendix Two for detailed calculations
[13] Government two party preferred vote: 2001 (50.98%), 1998 (49.02%), 1990 (49.9%), 1987 (50.8%), 1980 (50.4%), 1969 (49.8%), 1961 (49.5%), 1954 (49.3%), 1951 (50.7%), 1949 (51.0%)

A.4. FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS A KEY "COMMUNITY OF INTEREST":

It is further submitted that such a criteria is implicit in the redistribution criteria of 66(3)(b)(i) in its reference to:

> "community of interest within the proposed Electoral Division, including economic, social and regional interests."

It is submitted that there is a strong community of interest within all electorates in ensuring that elections are free and fair, and that boundaries are not biased towards one party or another. Such a strong community of interest has been found to be important by the Fitzgerald Inquiry, which emphasised the importance of electoral reform in the overhaul of public policy in Queensland in 1989[14]:

> "A fundamental tenet of the established system of parliamentary democracy is that public opinion is given effect by regular, free, fair elections following open debate. A government in our political system which achieves office by means other than by free and fair elections lacks political authority over that system...The point has already been made that the institutional culture of public administration risks degeneration if, for any reason, a Government's activities ceased to be moderated by concern at the possibility of losing power."

Justice Fitzgerald noted that the fairness of the electoral process in Queensland was "widely questioned", with concerns that: "...focus broadly upon the electoral boundaries, which are seen as distorted in favour of the present government, so as to allow it to retain power with minority support."

Dr J H Rawlings, in "Law and the Electoral Process"[15] makes a similar point:

> "The importance of a system of free elections lies in the fact that it confers initial legitimacy upon those who are selected to exercise governmental authority within the state....In this sense the electoral process provides an essential element in maintaining the continuity of the State."

All electors have a strong community of interest in free and fair elections in that the economic security and social stability of our nation depend on the maintenance of representative democracy. As such, the Commission should guard against systemic biases to one political party against another. As this proposed redistribution contains a strong systematic bias towards the Government, it offends the principle of free and fair elections, and the implied constitutional principle of representative democracy. The Commission should investigate whether it can achieve a less biased outcome through another permutation that meets the criteria of section 66(3).

This submission goes onto argue that the criteria of 66(3) can be better met with a different permutation of electoral boundaries that does not produce such an electoral bias. On that basis, it is submitted that the Commission needs to give serious consideration to major revisions of aspects of this redistribution to remove any semblance of bias from its boundaries.

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[14] Fitzgerald G.A (1989) "A report pursuant to Orders in Council" Goprint Brisbane p.127
[15] Rawlings H.F (1988) "Law and the Electoral Process" Sweet & Maxwell, Bristol

B. OBJECTIONS ON ELECTORATES UNDER AND OVER QUOTA:

The Commonwealth Electoral Act (section 66(3)(a)) requires the Commission to produce electorates that fall within the range of plus or minus 3.5% of the projected quota established under section 63A. Table 3 shows that the Commission has complied with this requirement, but that in several cases, the margin is very thin:

- the rural electorates of Wide Bay, Capricornia and Maranoa fall perilously close to the margin at 3.22%, 2.74% and 2.89% below quota. Wide Bay is a particularly problematic case as it is also under quota in 2003 (-0.15%), with the slippage extending over time. By contrast, the neighbouring electorate of Hinkler is well over quota (+5.6% in 2003 and +0.96% in 2007), exacerbated ironically by transfer of thousands of voters from Wide Bay. The rural electorate of Groom is also 1.03% under quota in 2007, although over quotas in 2003. All five electorates suffer from enrolment growth rates well below the State average. It is submitted that Wide Bay, Maranoa, Capricornia and Groom should increase in enrolment to minimise the possibility of any of the seats undershooting the 3.5% buffer in 2003.

- the Brisbane southside electorates of Bonner and Moreton are well over quota in 2007 (+2.5% and 2.43%) respectively, and in 2003 (+0.28% and +1.11%). As both electorates have above average enrolment growth rates, this seems a poor outcome, particularly as Bonner is a new seat and Moreton has been subjected to major change. Suggested boundaries are found in the next section to reduce the prospect of the 3.5% margin being overshot.

B.1 BOUNDARY OF HINKLER AND WIDE BAY

It is submitted that a net 1700 voter be transferred from Hinkler to Wide Bay by transferring the Shires of Gayndah and Mundubbera to Wide Bay and Biggenden to Hinkler. Gayndah and Mundubbera are currently in the electorate of Wide Bay. These transfers would bring both seats to a roughly similar enrolment projection in 2007. It is submitted that these transfers satisfy the four criteria in section 66(3)(b)

(i) Gayndah and Mundubbera have more in common with Maryborough than Bundaberg, and close connections and transport links with the South Burnett shires of Murgon and Wondai. Biggenden is roughly equidistant from Bundaberg and Maryborough, although its closer major centre (Childers) is in Hinkler with a similar agricultural base.

(ii) The Burnett Highway connects Gayndah and Mundubbera south to Murgon (in Wide Bay) and west to Maryborough and Gympie. It rail line connects it to Maryborough. Biggenden is connected by a minor road to Maryborough, but by the Isis Highway north to Childers (in Hinkler).

(iii) Gayndah and Mundubbera straddle the Boyne and Barambah valleys, which include the shires of Wondai and Murgon (in Wide Bay). Both rivers are dammed in Wide Bay and irrigation is provided downstream.

(iv) There is a strong community of interest between Gayndah and Mundubbera and Wide Bay. These changes would result in the return of 3200 electors to Wide Bay, and the loss of 1053 electors to Hinkler. More electors of the current Wide Bay would be retained in the seat.

B.2. BOUNDARIES OF CAPRICORNIA, MARANOA AND GROOM

While Capricornia and Maranoa are well under quota in 2007, both are well over quota in 2003. This suggest that any transfers should be kept small. It is suggested that the enrolment of both seats should be increased by about 700, bringing both within 2% of quota in 2007, and within 6.3% of quota in 2003. This could be achieved by returning the shire of Jericho to Capricornia (700 electors), and adding the shire of Clifton (1400 electors) to Maranoa. Groom would be brought up to quota by uniting all of Crows nest Shire in Groom (add 2400 electors).

(i) Jericho Shire was included in Capricornia for the last two redistributions at least. It has a strong community of interest with the electorate, connecting along the Capricorn Highway and rail line to Rockhampton. Clifton Shire has a strong community of interest with Maranoa, located just 45 km from Warwick (its largest town) and is close to Warwick Shire's northernmost town of Allora. Crows Nest Shire is currently split between Groom and Blair, with most of its population in Groom, but with Crows Nest in Blair. Crows Nest has much stronger economic and social links to Toowoomba 40km away than to Ipswich 140km away.

(ii) Jericho is linked to Rockhampton by rail and the Capricorn Highway. It is also linked by an unsealed road to Clermont. Clifton is linked to Warwick by the New England Highway and by rail. Crows Nest is linked to Toowoomba by the New England Highway.

(iii) Unlike the shires to the east and west Jericho is part of the Belyando River valley, which flows north into Belyando Shire (in Capricornia). Clifton is part of the Southern Downs region, centred on the Condamine Valley which flows northward from Warwick through most of the Maranoa shires. Crows Nest Shire lies mostly on the western side of the Great Dividing Range (as does Groom), while Blair lies on the eastern side.

(iv) Jericho has been in Capricornia through several redistributions. While Clifton has been in Groom, this argument is outweighed by the strong community of interest of transferring all of Crows Nest shire to Groom, and the close links between Clifton and Warwick. Crows Nest is currently in Blair, but this is outweighed by the strong community of interest argument to return it to Groom, as it was before Blair was created in 1997.

The proposed changes to Bonner, Moreton, Capricornia, Wide Bay, Hinkler and Groom bring all electorates closer to the projected quota in 2007, more clearly within the allowed variation of +-3.5%:

% VARIATION FROM PROJECTED QUOTA IN 2007:

Electorate	AEC projection	Democrat projection
Bonner	+2.5%	+1.62%
Moreton	+2.43%	+0.2%
Groom	-1.03%	-0.3%
Maranoa	-2.89%	-1.8%
Capricornia	-2.74%	-2.1%
Hinkler	+0.96%	-1.3%
Wide Bay	-3.22%	-0.9%

C. OBJECTIONS ON COMMUNITY OF INTEREST GROUNDS:

C.1. BOUNDARY OF FORDE AND RANKIN

It is submitted that the suburb of Loganholme should be contained in a single electorate of Rankin rather than split between three electorates as proposed by the Commission. Loganholme is a major Logan City centre, containing its major shopping centre and educational facilities. Currently, the suburb is split between three electorates, which defies community of interest criteria:

(i) The "tongue" included in Forde ignores the natural boundaries of Loganholme formed by Slacks Creek and the Logan River. Loganholme residents would shop at Loganholme Hyperdome (in Rankin) and send their children to local secondary schools (in the proposed Bowman).

(ii) Loganholme's principal transport corridor is the Pacific Motorway to the north, which links into Rankin, and the Logan Motorway to the West, which also links into Rankin.

(iii) Loganholme's locality boundaries follow the strong natural features of Slacks Creek in the west and the Logan River in the South.

(iv) Community interest criteria in placing all of a single suburb in one electorate one with strong natural boundaries overrides this criteria.

The transfer of Loganholme to Rankin leaves Forde under quota. This could be resolved by transferring the remainder of Logan City Balance SSD to Forde, and the Ipswich South West SSD from Blair (see below). The Logan City SSD is an acreage living area (currently split between Forde and Rankin), similar in makeup to the northern part of the Beaudesert Shire. It also has clearly defined boundaries of Bumstead Road to the north, and the Mt Lindsay Highway to the east.

C.2. BOUNDARY BETWEEN RANKIN AND MORETON:

The amalgamation of Loganholme , the addition of Carbrook and the transfers to and from Forde constitute a net addition of around 6500 electors to the proposed Rankin. It is proposed that this be overcome by transferring to Moreton all of those suburbs contained in Brisbane City (Kuraby, Stretton, Drewvale (6800 electors). This would leave the seat of Rankin entirely contained within the boundaries of Logan City, which would then be mostly in Rankin (89.7%).

(i) These changes closely align Rankin with the interests of Logan City. The transfer of Kuraby, Stretton and Drewvale to Moreton would firmly establish Moreton as a seat along the southern suburbs of Brisbane City. These boundaries also unite all of Stretton in a single electorate

(ii) There are strong transport links from Kuraby into Moreton (e.g. Beenleigh Road) and Kuraby lies on the same railway line as most Moreton stations. Stretton and Drewvale share the same Beaudesert Road corridor as the suburbs of Algester, Parkinson and Calamvale now in Moreton.

(iii) The Brisbane City border forms a clear and obvious border between Rankin and Moreton, emphasised by open space on the Brisbane side..

(iv) This transfers Kuraby back to Moreton (3955 electors), including that part that was previously in Rankin.

C.3. BOUNDARY BETWEEN BLAIR AND FORDE:

To bring Forde up to quota, it is submitted that the Ipswich South West SSD should be transferred from Blair to Forde.

(i) Ipswich South West has a strong community of interest south into Boonah Shire, both of which are agricultural areas centred on the Warrill Creek and Purga Creek valleys. Harrisville and Peak Crossing are located about 15km from Boonah, and enjoy strong economic and social links with the shire, and are included in the same State Electorate (Beaudesert). Against that, it should be acknowledged that Ipswich South West is part of the Ipswich City Council, which is currently contained completely within Blair and Oxley. But, the new boundaries of Boonah Shire have already pushed it into part of what used to be the Ipswich South West SSD.

(ii) Harrisville and Peak Crossing share the same transport corridor with Boonah Shire (Boonah-Ipswich Road and the Cunningham Highway).

(iii) Harrisville and Peak Crossing are in the lower reaches of the Warrill and Purga Creek valleys, both shared with the Boonah Shire. The Warrill Valley is irrigated from Moogerah Dam, located in the Boonah Shire.

(iv) Currently, Ipswich South West is split between Blair (1500 electors) and Oxley (1100 electors). This criteria is overridden by the need for Forde to be within quota tolerance, and the community of interest criteria above.

C.4. BOUNDARY BETWEEN OXLEY AND BLAIR

The transfer of the rest of Crows Nest Shire to Groom and Ipswich South West SSD to Forde leaves Blair approximately 6000 electors below quota in 2007. This could be resolved by continuing the Commission's proposed transfer of electors from Oxley to Blair by adding the suburbs of Eastern Heights, and the suburbs of Basin Pocket, East Ipswich and Newtown. Or, if the Commission's interest was in utilising natural boundaries as much as possible rather than suburban streets, it could be achieved by pushing the border of Blair east to Bundamba Creek and including the suburbs of Booval, Silkstone and Eastern Heights in Blair (to retain quota, North Booval would stay in Oxley). This would push the border a 4km west of the Ipswich CBD along Brisbane Road. This would then require the transfer of Karalee from the eastern extreme of Blair to Oxley (to which it enjoys a strong community of interest along the Warrego Highway). The borders of Oxley would then be the Brisbane River in the north, Oxley Creek in the east, and Bundamba Creek in the west (with the exception of North Booval between Bundamba Creek, the rail line and Nathan Street) and a straight line along Rea Road to the Bremer River defining Karalee.

(i) The transfer of the central business district of Ipswich but not its inner eastern suburbs separates many Ipswich residents from the centre in which they work and shop, and where their children are educated. These proposals push the border out from 750m east of the Ipswich CBD to 4.5km, placing all but one of the inner Ipswich suburbs in Blair. Karalee is mainly a commuter suburb of Brisbane, its main access being along the Warrego Highway into Ipswich's eastern suburbs (in Oxley). It closest major shopping centre (measured in travelling time) is Redbank Plaza, its closest train station Dinmore, both in Oxley.

(ii) The transport corridors of Ipswich's inner suburbs all relate back to its CBD (in Blair). Karalee's principal transport route in and out is the Warrego Highway east into Oxley.

(iii) The new border with Oxley removes the extension of Oxley into Blair, pushing the border a further 4.5km east, utilising the natural border of Bundamba Creek, which neatly divides the central and eastern suburbs of Ipswich. This continues the trend proposed by the Commission of pushing Blair into Ipswich. The shift of Karalee into Oxley removes the oddly shaped eastern "intrusion" of Blair, creating a border that roughly north-south in a straight line along Rea Road and Bundamba rough rather than the proposed pronounced inverted "s". Karalee is clearly defined by the river on three sides, and by open ground east of Rea Road on the other.

(iv) The inclusion of the Ipswich CBD in Blair is significant, and the transfer of the inner eastern suburbs into Blair places all of the oldest suburbs of inner Ipswich in a single seat. This community of interest overrides the desirability of keeping Oxley intact.

C.5. BOUNDARY BETWEEN OXLEY AND MORETON

The south-western suburbs of Brisbane have obviously created a conundrum for the Commission, with a large transfer of voters from Ryan to Oxley, the continued proposed separation of Corinda from the neighbouring suburb of Sherwood, the continued split of Acacia Ridge between two electorates, and the transfer of a large number of suburbs from Rankin to Moreton. It is submitted that these borders need to be comprehensively reviewed to ensure that proper community of interest is recognised, particularly given large transfers of voters are already proposed.

This submission proposes that the entire Oxley/Corinda/Sherwood/Chelmer corridor be placed in a single electorate (Oxley), and that Acacia Ridge be reunited in Moreton. This would create a logical natural border between the two electorates of Oxley Creek and its extensive floodplain.

(i) There is a strong community of interest across the Oxley to Chelmer corridor. This is a continuous string of suburbs defined by the Brisbane River to the west, Oxley Creek to the east, and Ipswich Motorway to the south. They share a common transport corridor (Oxley Road and the Ipswich rail line), and many common facilities. Its principal commercial area is centred on the southern part of Sherwood and the northern part of Corinda, which are currently split between electorates. Corinda (Oxley) includes the High School, shopping centre, and Catholic and Anglican schools that services most of the region.
The splitting of Acacia Ridge separates the residential part of the suburb from its important industrial side, and from nearby suburbs sharing the Beaudesert Road corridor. Its strongest community of interests is back towards the neighbouring suburbs of Coopers Plains, Archerfield and Salisbury (in Moreton), which have a similar demographic makeup.

(ii) These changes would better reflect local transport corridors, including the Oxley Road/Ipswich rail line orientation of the Oxley/Chelmer corridor, and the Beaudesert Road orientation of the suburbs of Salisbury, Acacia Ridge and Calamvale included in Moreton.

(iii) These changes better reflect local geography, setting a clear natural border along Oxley Creek and its floodplain, which varies from in width from 3km between the built up areas Durack and Acacia Ridge, and 2.5km between Sherwood and Rocklea.

(iv) The strong community of interest outlined above outweigh this criteria.

C.6. BOUNDARY OF RANKIN, BOWMAN & BONNER:

While the decision to retain all of Redlands shire in the single seat of Bowman is welcomed, the decision to excise part of Logan City to bring the electorate up to quota needs to be revisited. The result is to continue the current three-way split of the suburb of Loganholme between three electorates, the four-way spilt of Logan City into four electorates (when it could fit into two), and the denial of the community of interest of Redlands Shire north into Brisbane City.

It is submitted that the suburbs of Loganholme and Carbrook-Cornubia should be included in Rankin rather than Bowman: This would then require Bowman to retain more of its current suburbs from the new seat of Bonner. Its quotas could be made up by excising the suburb of Lota and part of Manly West, bound by the main roads of Manly Road, Whites Road and Rickert Road

(i) Carbrook/Cornubia/Loganholme has a stronger community interest with Rankin than with Bowman. As the Commission itself acknowledges it should be "guided wherever possible by boundaries of municipal districts as indicators of community of interest" (para 30). This move reduces the number of divisions in which Logan City is located from four to three, placing 90% of it in Rankin. The split of Loganholme between three divisions ignores the strong community of interest of retaining a full suburb's locality boundaries within a single division. The proposed boundaries put Loganholme's two private and two golf courses in Bowman, its main shopping centre and State High School in Rankin, and its State Primary School and main sporting fields are in Forde.

(ii) Loganholme and Carbrook's main transport corridor is into Rankin to the Logan Motorway rather than north into Bowman. By contrast, Lota is located on the Cleveland rail line, and linked back into Cleveland by Rickertt Road and Green Camp Road. Lota is located 15km from Bowman's main centre of Cleveland (or four train stops), while Loganholme is located 25km from Cleveland (with no train link).

(iii) The Redlands Shire southern border forms a natural border between the urban area of Logan City and Bowman, following as it does the Carbrook Wetlands, and the Bushland Parks south of Mt Cotton. The alignment of Bowman to the north recognises the links between Brisbane and Redlands, and continues the alignment of Bowman along the shore of Moreton Bay.

(iv) These changes transfer 3500 current Bowman electors back into Bowman.

C.7. BOUNDARY BETWEEN GRIFFITH, MORETON AND BONNER

The boundary of Griffith and Moreton splits the suburbs of Annerley and Yeronga and requires an offsetting transfer of electors from Griffith to Bonner. Similarly the border between Griffith and Bonner splits the suburbs of Mt Gravatt East (formerly in Griffith) and Holland Park West. Moreton and Bonner are projected to be well over quota in both 2003 and 2007 despite above average growth rates, while Griffith is under quota despite a low growth rate. The transfer of Lota/Manly West to Bowman necessitates a net transfer of voters from Moreton to Bonner.

It is proposed that the suburbs of Yeronga, Annerley and Fairfield be re-united back in Moreton, Mt Gravatt East be re-united back in Griffith, the rest of Holland Park West and Mt Gravatt be transferred from Bonner to Griffith, that Eight Mile Plains be reunited in Bonner, and that Macgregor and part of Sunnybank be transferred from Moreton to Bonner. Bonner's western border would continue south along Creek and Newhnam to Broadwater Road, andits southern border west along Underwood and Daw Roads to Mains Road, then north to Mt Gravatt Road. This emphasises Bonner's rough rectangular shape. Re-instating Cornwall Street as the border between Griffith and Moreton along Cornwall Street uses a clear locality boundary.

(i) The splitting of Annerley and Yeronga fails to reflect the community of interest across Annerley, Yeronga, Fairfield and Tarragindi.. It places Annerley's State Primary school is placed in Griffith, its State High School and its Catholic Primary School in Moreton, its commercial strip in Moreton but is main shopping centre (Fairfield) is in Griffith. Yeronga's Catholic primary school, RSL club and shopping centre are in Griffith, but its High School, State School, and TAFE College are in Moreton.
In respect of Mt Gravatt East, The proposed boundaries see the Mt Gravatt Plaza shopping centre,Mt Gravatt High School and Primary School in Bonner, but the Mt Gravatt TAFE College in Griffith. It places Holland Park High School and Marshall Rd Primary School in Bonner, but the Holland Park Catholic Primary School in Griffith.
In respect of Eight Mile Plains, the proposed border splits the suburb, separating its eastern part from its schools to the south. The main shopping centre (Garden City) at Upper Mount Gravatt (Bonner) also provides an important regional focus for nearby suburbs of Macgregor (Moreton) and Eight Mile Plains (Moreton/Bonner).

(ii) Annerley, Fairfield and Yeronga share the same transport corridor along Fairfield Road and Ipswich Road and the rail. Indeed, Annerley and Fairfield share the same train station. Mt Gravatt East, Mt Gravatt and Holland Park West share the same access roads to the city (Logan Road and Cavendish Road) as the southern suburbs of Griffith.
Eight Mile Plains, Macgregor and Sunnybank share the same transport corridor as the Bonner suburbs of Upper Mt Gravatt and Mansfield, clustered around the South East Freeway and Logan Road.

(iii) Cornwall Street forms a clear boundary between Griffith and Moreton than Ekibin Road with most of its length bordered by parkland, the Princess Alexandra Hospital and the Buranda Shopping Centre, and is the locality boundary for Annerley and Fairfield. The suggested border

between Griffith and Bonner follows locality borders, prevents the splitting of two suburbs, and extends the Creek Road straight line south. The new proposed border between Moreton and Bonner largely follows suburb boundaries. The exception is the "joining up of the square" formed by the southern border of Eight Mile Plains (Underwood Rd/Daw Rd) and the western border of Macgregor (Mains Rd). This necessitates the splitting of Sunnybank utilising a six lane major road.

(iv) These changes will transfer 8300 electors back to Moreton (Annerley/Yeronga/Fairfield) and transfer 5700 electors from Bonner back to Griffith (Mt Gravatt East) re-uniting all suburbs in a single electorate. To restore the quota of Bonner, 12,000 electors would be transferred from Moreton, reuniting Eight Mile Plains, but splitting Sunnybank.

C.8. BOUNDARY OF RYAN AND BRISBANE:

This submission objects to the decision to split the suburbs of The Gap and Paddington between these two seats. The decision makes little sense as the two transfers split suburbs but offset each other in statistical terms. It is proposed that The Gap be reunited in Ryan and most of Paddington be returned to Brisbane.

(i) The Gap as a suburb is currently contained entirely in Ryan, and has been for many years. It is a self-contained suburb, with its border clearly by ridges, bushland and public reserves to the north, south and west, and the parkland to the east This distribution transfers roughly 25% of the suburb to Brisbane, ignoring its obvious geographic boundaries. It also places The Gap State School and the Catholic Primary School in Brisbane, but The Gap State High School and shopping centre into Ryan.
Latrobe Terrace as a boundary splits the commercial heart of Paddington. It is a narrow snaking ridge-top road, with shops on both sides for most of its length. It splits a suburb with a strong sense of community, separating the southern half of Paddington from Paddington, Red Hill and the City with which it has the strong social, economic and community links..

(ii) The Gap's principal thoroughfare is Waterworks Road. There is no rationale or logic to argue that a quarter of the suburb is on a different transport corridor. Paddington's principal transport corridor is Latrobe Terrace for residents living both north and south of the street.

(iii) The most obvious border for Ryan is to include all of the suburb of The Gap, as the suburb's boundaries follow clear geographic features across the tops of the ridges north, south and east of the suburb. A more obvious Ryan/Brisbane border between Boundary Road and the River would could be Baroona Road and Heussler Terrace, as most of their length is bordered by parkland and commercial/industrial use.

(iv) These changes restore 1600 electors to Ryan and 2600 electors to Brisbane, meeting community of interest and electoral continuity criteria.

C.9. BOUNDARIES OF PETRIE AND LILLEY

While the Commission proposes minimal changes to Petrie and Lilley, the result is an increasingly long, thin electorate of Petrie with little community of interest across the electorate. It creates a "tongue" just 3-4km wide, but 18km long, slicing the suburbs of Aspley, Stafford Heights and Stafford, and separately Chermside from Chermside West. While the "tongue" has been a feature of Petrie through several redistributions, the high growth in its northern end has seen the "tongue" become smaller and narrower over time, shedding a further 6000 electors in this redistribution.

It is submitted that it is time for the Commission to cut off the Petrie "tongue" rather than merely frittering away at the edges. Petrie could be established as an outer northern suburbs seat with a strong bayside orientation by the inclusion of Sandgate, Deagon and Brighton. Lilley would then become more of an inner northern suburbs seat with the inclusion of Stafford, Stafford Heights, Chermside West and McDowell. This would involve an exchange of 12,700 electors between the two electorates.

(i) The suburbs along the Petrie "tongue" have more links to Lilley than with the rest of Petrie. The principal shopping, regional centre and hospital for the north-eastern suburbs (including the Petrie suburbs of Stafford Heights, Chermside West, McDowell and Aspley) is at Chermside in Lilley.
By contrast, the Petrie suburbs of Bald Hills and Bracken Ridge have a strong community of interest with Sandgate (e.g. Sandgate High and St John Fisher College, shopping facilities, transport). Indeed, Bald Hills, Brighton and Sandgate form a clearly defined sub-region bounded by Cabbage Tree Creek, Telegraph Road, and the Pine River.

(ii) Stafford/Stafford Heights/Chermside West use the same transport corridor as Chermside/Kedron – based mainly on Webster Road and Gympie Road. Bracken Ridge shares the same transport corridor as Sandgate – the Gateway Arterial and Sandgate Road to the east, and Gympie Road to the west. Redcliffe uses the same transport corridor as Sandgate (Deagon Deviation onto Sandgate Road).

(iii) Geographically, the "inner northern suburbs" group around Chermside as the sub-regional centre. Sandgate and Brighton are the only bayside suburbs in Lilley, while the bay is an important part of defining the geographical identity of Redcliffe City in Petrie. The "natural border" between Petrie and Lilley would follow Cabbage Tree creek from the sea to Gympie Road, Gympie Road and Webster Road south, and Hamilton Road east (which is bordered mostly by open space and parkland)..

(iv) The recognition of the strong communities of interest between the southern part of Petrie with Lilley, and the northern part of Lilley with Petrie outweighs the inconvenience of the transfers, which, in any event, account for only 13.5% of electors of both seats.

C.10. BOUNDARY BETWEEN HINKLER AND CAPRICORNIA

The boundary between Hinkler and Capricornia was always destined to be problematic. At the last redistribution, the matter was resolved by transferring Mt Morgan Shire (and part of Fitzroy) to Hinkler, even though Mt Morgan is closer to Rockhampton than Gladstone. This time, the Commission proposes shifting Mt Morgan/Fitzroy to Capricornia and adding Monto/Eidsvold (an area of similar enrolment) to Hinkler. It is submitted that this decision should be reviewed, and Mt Morgan stay in Hinkler with Monto/Eidsvold moving to Capricornia.

(i) Mt Morgan has a much stronger community of interest to Rockhampton (Capricornia) 39km away than it does to Gladstone (Hinkler) 135km away. But, so too does Monto. Monto is closer to Rockhampton up the Burnett Highway (238km) than it is to Bundaberg over a party unsealed minor road through Mt Perry (262km). Monto's nearest major regional centre is Biloela, 93km away, which is now in Capricornia. As such, Monto's strongest community of interest probably lies north to Capricornia rather than east to Hinkler. It should also be pointed out that Gladstone and Rockhampton are both important economic centres in the Capricorn Coast region, with links to Mt Morgan.

(ii) The Commission's report argues that Monto/Eidsvold should be included in Hinkler because "there is a road network linking the Shires of Monto, Eidsvold, Gayndah and Mundubbera that links to Bundaberg." This is not strictly accurate, as the only sealed highway linking Monto and Eidsvold to Bundaberg is the Burnett/Isis Highway, which, on the Commission's boundaries, would deviate out of Hinkler into Wide Bay when it passes through Biggenden. The only other, more direct route, is a partly sealed road from Eidsvold to Gin Gin via Mt Perry, but this is not a major road. The major road link through Monto and Eidsvold is the north-south Burnett highway, linking Monto to Biloela (93km) and then onto Rockhampton (238km), and south to Brisbane. On the partly sealed Mt Perry Road, Monto is 262km from Bundaberg, and 320km via the Burnett and Isis Highways. Mt Morgan has good road links to Gladstone (approximately 139km), although Rockhampton is closer (39km).

(iii) A series of mountain ranges provide a strong natural boundary between Monto and Eidsvold and the coastal plain of Bundaberg and Gladstone . While Monto is located on a tributary of the Burnett River, the river flows south to Gayndah before heading north. Monto is clearly an inland shire, similar in geography to Banana Shire to the north. Mt Morgan Shire is close to Bundaberg, but faces similar challenges to the many small communities between Rockhampton and Gladstone in the Fitzroy and Calliope Shires. It shares with Calliope Shire a coastal plain aspect, while Monto shares with Banana Shire more of an inland shire geography.

(iv) It is submitted that both Mt Morgan and Monto shires both share a stronger community of interest with Capricornia than with Hinkler. On balance, in trying to determine which set of voters should make up the Hinkler quota, the fact that retaining Mt Morgan in Hinkler would result in minimum disruption is a relevant consideration.

C.11. CHECK ON BIAS AND POLITICAL SENSITIVITY

SWING NEEDED TO CHANGE SEATS (Two party preferred vote)

Percentage	Current Seats	AEC proposal	Democrat proposal
15%+	Maranoa 16.0% Moncrieff 15.4% Groom 15.1%	Moncrieff 16.3 Maranoa 15.4 Groom 15.1	Moncreiff 16.3 Maranoa 15.8 Groom 15.1
10-15%	Fadden 12.3% McPherson12.5% Fisher 12.1% Wide Bay 10.7%	Fadden 13.1 McPherson 12.2% Fisher 10.8%	Fadden 13.1 McPherson 12.2% Fisher 10.8% Wide Bay 10.1%
6-10%	Fairfax 9.2% Kennedy 9.0% Ryan 8.6% Blair 8.5% Dawson 8.0% Forde 7.4% Leichhardt 6.4%	Wide Bay 9.9% Ryan 9.1% Fairfax 9.2% Kennedy 8.4% Dawson 8% Forde 7.0% Blair 6.6% Leichhardt 6.4%	Ryan 9.4% Fairfax 9.2% Kennedy 8.4% Dawson 8% Forde 7.4% Leichhardt 6.4%
3-6%	Dickson 6.0% Moreton 4.2% Petrie 3.2%	Dickson 6.0% Petrie 3.2% Bowman 3.1%	Dickson 6% Blair 4.7%
1-3%	Longman 2.7% Herbert 1.6%	Longman 2.5% Moreton 2.4% Hinkler 2.2% Herbert 1.5%	Longman 2.5% Herbert 1.5%
0-1%	Hinkler 0.1%		Bowman 0.9% Hinkler 0.6% Petrie 0.6% Moreton 0.1%
0 - -1%		Brisbane -0.7%	Brisbane -0.9% Bonner -1.0%
-1% - -3%	Bowman 1.4%	Rankin 2.4%	Rankin -1.9% Lilley -2.0%
-3% - -6%	Griffith 5.7% Lilley 4.8% Brisbane 3.1%	Lilley 4.6% Capricornia 5.5%	Capricornia -4.2% Oxley -4.5% Griffith -5.7%
-6% -	Oxley 8.1% Capricornia 6.9% Rankin 6.7%	Griffith 6.1% Oxley 8.0%	

The Democrat proposal reduces the margin of 5 Government seats, pushing them in to the marginal range (0-6%) ,while increasing the margins of 4 "safe" seats. The proposal reduces the margins of 6 Labor seats, making the entire political pendulum more sensitive to the will of the electorate.

The final table provides estimates of the pro-Government in the AEC and Democrat proposals The Democrat proposal substantially reduces the pro-Government bias inherent in the AEC proposals, producing a neutral distribution across the 20 most winnable seats sample, a slight Opposition benefit across the 14 most marginal seats, and a slight Government advantage on majority of seats (the 15th seat) benchmark. The details of this calculation are contained in Appendix Two.

No. of seats in sample	AEC proposal bias	Democrat proposal bias
28 seats	0.301%	0.266%
20 most winnable	0.675%	-0.002%
14 most marginal	1.08%	-0.349%
For the 15th seat	2.68%	0.98%

C.12 . SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED CHANGES:

Seat	2003 enrolment AEC proposal	2007 enrolment AEC proposal	2003 enrolment Dem. proposal	2007 enrolment Dem proposal
Blair	87357	92711	87671	92848
Bonner	84311	95968	82574	95147
Bowman	81718	93842	81691	93606
Brisbane	80251	91046	81005	91849
Capricornia	88717	91062	89562	91693
Dawson	87398	93437	87398	93437
Dickson	80206	92029	80206	92029
Fadden	75838	96668	75838	96668
Fairfax	78209	92107	78209	92107
Fisher	80564	95462	80564	95462
Forde	80422	92787	80596	92701
Griffith	86400	93558	88974	95715
Groom	85038	92665	85664	93358
Herbert	83435	92957	83435	92957
Hinkler	88788	94524	86444	92419
Kennedy	90860	95378	90860	95378
Leichhardt	85467	93124	85467	93124
Lilley	89238	93928	89082	93833
Longman	81230	95162	81230	95162
McPherson	78087	94545	78087	94545
Maranoa	86946	90922	87976	91968
Moncrieff	81002	93173	81002	93173
Moreton	85014	95900	81185	93766
Oxley	85035	94729	84431	92752
Petrie	84487	94154	85260	94855
Rankin	87349	94557	89157	94544
Ryan	86856	94484	85485	93075
Wide Bay	83953	90610	86128	92804

APPENDIX ONE: SUGGESTED CHANGES BY ELECTORATE

(denotes return of suburb currently in seat; # denotes loss of suburb currently in seat):*

Blair

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	87357	92711	95.7%
GAIN			
Ipswich Central (pt)(Oxley)	8000	8500	
LOSE			
Crows Nest (Groom)#	2332	2459	
Karalee (Oxley)#	2800	3100	
Ipswich SW (Forde)#	2554	2804	
Revised proposal	**87671**	**92848**	**90.7%**

(Eastern border: From Brisbane River east to Rea Road s, a line s to Bremer River sw, Nathan St s to rail line, e to Bundamba Ck, s to Beaudesert Shire Border. Southern border to exclude Ipswich SW SSD).

Bonner:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	84311	95968	n.a.
GAIN:			
Macgregor (Moreton)	3719	3719	
Runcorn (pt) (Moreton)	200	200	
Sunnybank (pt) (Moreton)	3000	3100	
Eight Mile Plns (Moreton)	5123	6295	
Eight Mile Plns (Rankin)	58	71	
LOSE			
Lota (Bowman)	1963	2100	
Manly West (pt)(Bowman)	1500	1650	
Mt Gravatt East (Griffith)	5650	5709	
Mt Gravatt (Griffith)	2104	2127	
Holland Park West (Griffith)	2620	2620	
Revised proposal	**82574**	**95147**	

(Northern border to follow shore of bay, Brittania St se, Whites Rd ne, Manly Rd se, Green Camp Rd s, Rickertt Rd w, then Brisbane City boundary.
Western border to follow Metroplex Rd s, Creek Rd s, Newhnam Rd s, Broadwater Rd w, Logan Rd s, sth border Mt Gravatt reserve w,, Mains Rd s, Beenleigh Rd se, Nathan Rd n, Daw Rd e, Underwood Rd e to Brisbane City border).

Bowman

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	87345	93842	67.7%
GAIN			
Lota (Bonner)*	1963*	2100*	
Manly West (pt)(Bonner)*	1500*	1650*	
LOSE			
Carbrook-Cornubia (Rankin)	2138	2545	
Loganholme (Rankin)(pt)	1352	1441	
Revised proposal	**81691**	**93606**	**71.7%**

(Northern border to follow shore of bay, Brittania St se, Whites Rd ne, Manly Rd se, Green Camp Rd s, Rickertt Rd w, then Redlands Shire bndry south.)

Brisbane:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	80251	91046	68.0%.
GAIN:			
Paddington (pt)(Ryan)*	2500	2600	
Milton (pt) (Ryan)*	500	500	
LOSE			
Stafford (Lilley)#	617	606	
The Gap (Ryan)	1629	1691	
Revised proposal	**81005**	**91849**	**70.1%**

(Northern border: Same as proposed to Trouts Rd s, then south to Kedron Brook then east along current Lilley border. Southern border: To follows current border to exclude The Gap, follow proposed border along Simpsons Rd and Macgreggor Tce, then Boundary St s, Baroona Rd e, Heussler Tce ne, Castlemaine St n, Caxton St e, Hale St s to river).

Capricornia:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	88717	91062	90.4%.
GAIN:			
Eidsvold W.Bay)	647	660	
Monto (W.Bay)	1869	1665	
Jericho (Maranoa)*	676	720	
LOSE			
Fitzroy (pt)(Hinkler)	373	388	
Mt Morgan (Hinkler)	1974	2026	
Revised proposal:	**89562**	**91693**	**91.3%**

(Border with Hinkler same as at present, adding Monto and Eidsvold Shires)

Dawson:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	87398	93437	100%

No changes proposed.

Dickson:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	80206	92029	88.7%

No changes proposed.

Fadden:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	75838	96668	41.7%

No changes proposed.

Fairfax:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	78209	92107	77.4%

No changes proposed.

Fisher:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	80564	94562	82.1%

No changes proposed.

Forde:

		2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed		80422	92787	88.7%
GAIN:				
Ipswich SW (Blair)		2554	2804	
Logan City Bal. (Rankin)		988	1089	
LOSE				
Loganholme (Rankin)	#	3368	3979	
Revised proposal:		**80596**	**92701**	**84.9%**

(Northern border: Beaudesert Shire border (w to e), Mt Lindsay Hwy n, Green Rd e, Bumstead Rd e, Chambers Flat r n, Logan Motorway e, Slacks Creek s, Logan River e to sea).

Griffith:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	86400	93558	59.1%
GAIN:			
Mt Gravatt East (Bonner)*	5650	5709	
Holland Park West (Bonner)	2620	2620	
Mt Gravatt (Bonner)	2104	2127	
LOSE:			
Annerley (Moreton)	3200	3366	
Yeronga (Moreton)	2965	3278	
Fairfield (Moreton)	1635	1655	
Revised proposal:	**88974**	**95715**	**64.5%**

(From River, Cornwall St e, South East Freeway se, Mt Gravatt Rd e, reserve sth boundary e, Logan Rd n, Broadwater Rd e, Newhnam Rd n, Creek Rd n to river.)

Groom:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	85038	92665	100%
GAIN:			
Crows Nest (Blair)	2332	2459	
LOSE:			
Clifton (Maranoa)#	1706	1766	
Revised proposal:	**85664**	**93358**	**98%**

Herbert:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	83425	92957	92.1%
No changes proposed.			

Hinkler:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	88788	94524	97.1%
GAIN:			
Mt Morgan (Capric.)*	1974	2026	
Fitzroy B (pt) (Capric.)*	373	388	
Biggenden (Wide Bay)	1089	1052	
LOSE:			
Gayndah (Wide Bay)	1860	1875	
Mundubbera (Wide Bay)	1404	1371	
Eidsvold (Capric.)	647	660	
Monto (Capric.)	1869	1665	
Revised proposal:	**86444**	**92419**	**100%**

Kennedy:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat

AEC proposed	90860	95378	100%
No changes proposed.			

Leichhardt:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	85467	93124	100%
No changes proposed.			

Lilley:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	89238	93928	100%
GAIN:			
Stafford (Brisbane)	617	606	
Stafford (Petrie)	2430	2378	
Stafford Heights (Petrie)	4752	4617	
Chermside West (pt)(Petrie)	2000	2140	
McDowell (pt) (Petrie)	2600	2900	
LOSE			
Sandgate (Petrie)#	4480	4511	
Brighton (Petrie)#	5887	6080	
Deagon (Petrie)#	2188	2145	
Revised proposal:	**89082**	**93833**	**85.5%**

(From bay:, Cabbage Tree Creek sw, Gympie Rd se, Webster Rd s, Hamilton Rd e, Old Northern Rd se, Flockton St e, Trouts Rd s,Kedron Brook e, then current border to River).

Longman:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	81230	95162	94.4%
No changes proposed.			

Maranoa:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	86946	90922	94.8%
GAIN:			
Clifton (Groom)	1706	1766	
LOSE:			
Jericho (Capricornia)	676	720	
Revised proposal:	**87976**	**91968**	**94.8%**

McPherson:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	78087	94545	80%
No changes proposed.			

Moncrieff:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	81002	93173	67.8%
No changes proposed.			

Moreton:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	85014	95900	61.4%
GAIN:			
Annerley (Griffith)*	3200	3366	
Yeronga (Griffith)*	2965	3278	
Fairfield (Griffith)*	1635	1655	
Seventeen M Rocks (Oxley)	1100	2000	
Acacia Ridge (Oxley)	4258	4365	
Kuraby (Rankin)*	3079	5305	
MINUS			
Macgreggor (Bonner)#	3719	3719	
Eight Mile Plns (Bonner)#	5123	6295	
Runcorn (pt)(Bonner)#	200	200	
Sunnybank (pt) (Bonner)#	3000	3100	
Chelmer (Oxley)#	1852	1907	
Graceville (Oxley)#	2723	2969	
Sherwood (Oxley)#	3274	3426	
Revised Proposal	**81185**	**93766**	**54.8%**

(Borders: Brisbane River, Cornwall St e, Southeast Freeway se, Mains rd s, Beenleigh Rd se, Nathan Rd n, Daw Rd e, Underwood Rd s, Brisbane City border sw, Interstate rail line n, Adise Rd w, Oxley Creek to River).

Oxley:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	85035	94729	83.2%
GAIN:			
Karalee (Blair)	2800	3100	
Chelmer (Moreton)	1852	1907	
Graceville (Moreton)	2723	2969	
Sherwood (Moreton)	3274	3426	
MINUS:			
Acacia Ridge (Moreton)#	4258	4365	
Ipswich Central (Pt)(Blair)#	8000	8500	
Revised proposal	**84431**	**92752**	**73.9%**

(Brisbane River ne, Wolston Ck e, Centenary Hwy s, Ipswich Motorway ne, Oxley Creek s, Learoyd Rd e, Beaudesert Rd s, Brisbane City border w, Ipswich City border s & w, Bayliss Rd w, Bundamba Creek n, Harper St w, Swanbank Rd w, Edwards st w, Reedy Ck n, Deebing Ck n, Bremer River n, railway line e, Bremer R ne to Brisbane River.)

Petrie:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	84487	94154	93.6%
GAIN:			
Sandgate (Lilley)*	4480	4511	
Brighton (Lilley)*	5887	6080	
Deagon (Lilley)*	2188	2145	
LOSE:			
Stafford (Lilley)	2430	2378	
Stafford Heights (Lilley)	4752	4617	
Chermside West (pt) (Lilley)	2000	2140	
McDowell (pt) (Lilley)	2600	2900	
Revised proposal:	**85260**	**94855**	**80.6%**

Borders, see Lilley

Rankin:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	87349	94557	64.2%
PLUS			
Loganholme (Forde)	3368	3979	
Loganholme (Bowman)	1352	1441	
Carbrook (Bowman)	2138	2545	
Browns Plains (Oxley)	1574	1706	
MINUS			
Eight Mile Plns (Bonner)	58	71	
Logan City Bal. (Forde)#	988	1089	
Kuraby (Moreton)#	3079	5305	
Revised proposal	**89157**	**94544**	**61.8%**

(Border: Redlands Shire boundary from Logan River N nw, Underwood Rd w, Gateway Arterial s, Illaweena Rd e, Beaudesert Rd s, Beaudesert Shire border e, Chambers Flat Rd n, Bumstead rd w, Clarke Rd n, Fifth Ave n, Logan Motorway e, Slacks Creek s, Logan River e.)

Ryan:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	86856	94484	82.8%
GAIN:			
The Gap (Brisbane)*	1629*	1691*	
LOSE:			
Paddington (pt)(Brisbane)	2500	2600	
Milton (pt) (Brisbane)	500	500	
Revised proposal:	**85485**	**93075**	**84.6%**

Borders: See Brisbane..

Wide Bay:

	2003	2007	% of old seat in new seat
AEC proposed	83953	90610	78.6%
GAIN:			
Gayndah (Hinkler)*	1860*	1875*	
Mundubbera (Hinkler)*	1404*	1371*	
LOSE:			
Biggenden (Hinkler)#	1089#	1052#	
Revised proposal:	**86128**	**92804**	**81.2%**

APPENDIX TWO:

ESTIMATE OF ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN PROPOSED BOUNDARIES (%)

No of seats won	Government 2PP vote required	Opposition 2PP vote required	Difference
1	38.56	37.14	-1.42
2	39.46	39.04	-0.42
3	39.76	39.64	-0.12
4	41.76	40.54	-1.22
5	42.66	42.74	0.08
6	43.06	43.34	0.28
7	44.96	44.44	-0.52
8	45.66	46.64	0.98
9	45.76	47.34	1.58
10	46.46	47.54	1.08
11	46.86	47.64	0.78
12	47.86	48.24	0.38
13	48.26	48.34	0.08
14	48.46	51.14	2.68
15	48.86	51.54	2.68
16	51.66	51.74	0.08
17	51.76	52.14	0.38
18	52.36	53.14	0.78
19	52.46	53.54	1.08
20	52.66	54.24	1.58
21	53.36	54.34	0.98
22	55.56	55.04	-0.52
23	56.66	56.94	0.28
24	57.26	57.34	0.08
25	59.46	58.24	-1.22
26	60.36	60.24	-0.12
27	60.96	60.54	-0.42
28	62.86	61.44	-1.42
Average	**n.a.**	**n.a.**	**0.301**

To win 14 seats (i.e. Dickson), the Opposition requires a two-party preferred uniform swing of 6%. When added to its State-wide two party preferred vote of 45.14%, this would require a vote of 51.14%.

To hold 14 seats (i.e. Leichhardt), the Government can survive a swing against it of 6.4%. When subtracted from its 54.86% two-party preferred vote, this would require a state-wide vote of 48.46%. This implies a "bias" of 2.68% (i.e. 51.14% less 48.46%) that the Government has over the Opposition to achieve the same outcome.

A positive figure implies an advantage to the Government, a negative figure is an advantage to the Coalition. The average bias across all 28 seats is 0.301%. The average bias across the 20 most winnable seats (i.e requiring a state-wide two-party preferred vote of 58% or less) is 0.675%. The average bias across the 14 most marginal seats (i.e. requiring a state wide two party preferred vote of 54.5% or less) is 1.08%.

BIAS UNDER DEMOCRAT PROPOSED BOUNDARIES

No of seats won	Government 2PP vote required	Opposition 2PP vote required	Difference
1	38.56	39.44	0.88
2	39.06	40.64	1.58
3	39.76	40.94	1.18
4	41.76	43.14	1.38
5	42.66	43.24	0.58
6	43.06	44.14	1.08
7	44.76	44.24	-0.52
8	45.46	45.14	-0.32
9	45.66	45.74	0.08
10	46.46	45.74	-0.72
11	46.86	46.04	-0.82
12	47.46	46.64	-0.82
13	48.46	47.64	-0.82
14	48.86	49.84	0.98
15	50.16	51.14	0.98
16	52.36	51.54	-0.82
17	53.36	52.54	-0.82
18	53.96	53.14	-0.82
19	54.26	53.54	-0.72
20	54.26	54.34	0.08
21	54.86	54.54	-0.32
22	55.76	55.24	-0.52
23	55.86	56.94	1.08
24	56.76	57.34	0.58
25	56.86	58.24	1.38
26	59.06	60.24	1.18
27	59.36	60.94	1.58
28	60.56	61.44	0.88
Average			**0.27%**

The following table compares the average bias in the AEC proposed boundaries and those proposed by this submission for all 28 seats, for:

(a) for all 28 seats;

(b) for the 20 most winnable (i.e those requiring a state wide two party-preferred vote of more than 58%, although the Government could win 24 seats under these proposals with a vote of 56.86%);

(c) for the 14 most marginal seats (i.e. those seats requiring a state wide two party preferred vote of more than 54.5%).

(d) for the winning of a majority of seats (i.e. the 15th seat).

No. of seats in sample	AEC proposal bias	Democrat proposal bias
28 seats	0.301%	0.266%
20 most winnable	0.675%	-0.002%
14 most marginal	1.08%	-0.349%
For the 15th seat	2.68%	0.98%

It can be seen that this submission produces smaller systemic biases at all levels of measurement, and is completely neutral when measured across the 20 most winnable seats criterion.


Queensland Government
Natural Resources and Mines
The area of the City of Brisbane includes the whole of Bishop, Flaherman, Green, Moreton, Mud and St Helena Islands (being islands situated in or adjacent to Moreton Bay above low-water mark, and excludes land lying below high-water mark on both banks of the Brisbane River and of any other river, creek or stream within the area.
MORETON BAY
BRISBANE
CITY OF BRISBANE
RYAN
GRIFFITH
BONNER
BOWMAN
REDLAND
LILLEY
OXLEY
RANKIN
FADDEN
MORETON
CITY OF LOGAN
OBJECTION
No - 5

OBJECTION

No — 5

OBJECTION

No. 5




DALRYMPLE
CHARTERS TOWERS
Home Hill
TOWNSVILLE CITY
BOWEN
DAWSON
Whitsunday
WHITSUNDAY
JECTION
№ 5
CHARTERS TOWERS (CITY)
Proserpine
DAWSON MACKAY (CITY)
BARRIER
Collinsville
BOWEN
MIRANI
MACKAY
Sarina
NEBO
BROADSOUND
Moranbah
BELYANDO
CAPRICORNIA
Cape Townshend
LIVINGSTONE
Cape Clinton
Cape Manifold
Dysart
Clermont
Aramac
ROCKHAMPTON (CITY)
North Keppel I.
Yeppoon
PEAK DOWNS
JERICHO
FITZROY
ROCKHAMPTON
GLADSTONE (CITY)
CALLIOPE
Barcaldine
Alpha
Emerald
EMERALD
Blackwater
DUARINGA
GLADSTONE
HINKLER
MOUNT MORGAN
BANANA
Springsure
Blackall
Miriam Vale
MIRIAM VALE
BAUHINIA
Moura
Biloela
Tambo
TAMBO
Theodore
MONTO
BUNDABERG
EIDSVOLD
TAROOM
Taroom
Gayndah
WIDE BAY
Augathella
Injune
MURWEH
BOORINGA
BUNGIL
Wandoan
Charleville
Mitchell
Roma
BENDE
ROMA (TOWN)
MERE
MURILLA
Miles
Chinchilla
Kingaroy
MARANOA
WAMBO
Kilcoy
Surat
Dalby
Tara
WARROO
TARA
SEE MAP 2
BRISBANE
TOOWOOMBA
Cunnamulla
St George
BALONNE
PAROO
WAGGAMBA
Millmerran
WARWICK
Dirranbandi
Goondiwindi
INGLEWOOD
Inglewood
Stanthorpe